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Problem Definition: By providing an environmentally friendly alternative to traditional vehicles,
electric vehicles will transform urban mobility, particularly, in smart cities. In practice, once an
electric vehicle is plugged in, the charging station completes charging as soon as possible. Given that
the procurement cost of electricity and resulting carbon emissions vary significantly during a day,
substantial savings can be achieved by smart charging—delaying charging until the cost is lower. In
this paper, we study smart charging as an innovative business model for utility firms.
Practical Relevance: Utility firms are already investing in charging stations and they can achieve
significant cost savings through smart charging.
Methodology: We develop a sequential game in which a utility firm first announces pairs of
charging price and completion time. Then, each customer selects the pair that maximizes his/her
utility. Given the selected completion times, the utility firm solves a dynamic control problem to
determine the charging schedule that minimizes the cost of charging under time-varying electricity
procurement cost.
Results: We devise an intuitive and easy-to-implement policy for scheduling charging. We prove
that this policy is optimal if all customers arrive at the charging station simultaneously. We also
characterize properties of the optimal pairs of charging price and completion time. By using real
electricity demand and generation data from the largest electricity market in the U.S., we find that
cost and emissions savings from smart charging are approximately 20% and 15%, respectively.
Managerial Implications: In contrast to the current practice of charging vehicles without delay,
we show that it is economically and environmentally beneficial to delay charging for some vehicles
and to set charging prices based on the utility firm’s cost of electricity procurement. We also find that
most of the savings of smart charging can be achieved by implementing it only a few peak-demand
days in a month, highlighting its practical relevance.
Key words: Electric Vehicles, Business Model Innovation, Smart-city Operations, Energy-related
Operations, Sustainable Operations.
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1. Introduction
Electric vehicles will transform mobility, particularly, in smart cities, by providing an environmen-
tally friendly alternative to traditional vehicles (World Economic Forum 2018). This transformation
requires a $10 billion investment by 2030 for charging stations, which need to offer innovative busi-
ness models to manage the electricity demand created by vehicle charging (McKinsey & Company
2018). Under the current practice, whenever an electric vehicle is plugged in, its battery is typ-
ically charged at the maximum possible speed to complete charging as soon as possible (SEPA
2017). Given that the marginal generation cost of electricity and resulting carbon emissions vary
significantly during a day, some experts worry that vehicle charging can create significant cost and
emissions (The Washington Post 2015). However, customers do not necessarily require charging
as soon as possible, for example, when they park for more than a few hours. Therefore, compared
to charging vehicles as soon as possible, substantial cost and emissions savings can be achieved by
smart charging—delaying charging until the electricity generation cost is low. In this paper, we
study smart charging as an innovative business model for utility firms.
Utility firms expect a significant increase in the number of electric vehicles and some firms, such
as Southern California Edison, one of the largest utility firms in California, are already planning
to invest in their own charging stations (SEPA 2019, p. 26, Utility Dive 2019, and SCE 2014,
p. 49). Given that a utility firm incurs the additional cost of procuring (or generating) electricity
for charging electric vehicles and it is responsible for the resulting carbon emissions, the firm is in
an ideal position to manage charging (Baker et al. 2019).
Motivated by the need for innovative charging stations, we pose the following research questions.
What is the optimal charging policy of a utility firm under given charging completion times? What
are the desired charging completion times and how should the firm design a pricing scheme that
incentivizes customers to choose them? We consider the perspectives of the two types of utility firms
in the U.S.—public and investor-owned. A public utility firm, such as an electric cooperative, is not-
for-profit, whereas an investor-owned (or private) utility firm, such as Southern California Edison,
is for-profit (DOE 2015, p. 27). For either type of utility firms, a unique challenge of managing
electric vehicle charging is that customers have heterogeneous preferences (private information)
regarding their sensitivity to the completion time until which their vehicles are charged. This
heterogeneity affects the utility firm’s decisions on when to charge each electric vehicle, and, in
turn, the total charging cost under a time-varying cost for electricity generation. By properly
designing the pricing policy, the firm can incentivize customers with different delay-sensitivity to
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agree to different charging completion times, thus reducing the cost of charging and passing (part
of) cost savings to customers.
We model a sequential game between a utility firm and customers with electric vehicles. The
firm procures electricity at a time-varying cost to operate charging stations in its service region,
and announces pairs of charging price and completion time. Each customer then chooses the
pair that maximizes his/her utility which depends on the inconvenience cost that increases in the
completion time and the customer’s sensitivity to delay. Each customer’s sensitivity is his/her
private information, but the utility firm knows the distribution of the sensitivity across customer
population. We consider both a public utility firm, whose objective is to minimize the sum of
charging and inconvenience cost, and an investor-owned (or private) utility firm, whose objective
is to maximize the revenue from the charging service minus the charging cost. The key tradeoff
is between the charging cost and the inconvenience cost. The utility firm can reduce its charging
cost by delaying charging and procuring electricity at a lower cost than charging vehicles as soon
as possible, but this leads to a higher inconvenience cost for customers. We also calibrate this
analytical model by using real electricity generation and demand data from the PJM Interconnect,
the largest electricity market in the U.S., to illustrate our findings.
Our results offer several managerial insights for utility firms that seek innovative solutions to
electric vehicle charging. In contrast to the current practice of charging electric vehicles as soon
as possible, we show that it is optimal to delay charging for some vehicles and prices should be
based on the utility firm’s cost of electricity procurement. We do so by first devising an easy-to-
implement policy to minimize the cost of charging for given completion times. This policy is an
effective solution to a complex, dynamic control problem given the time-varying cost of electricity
procurement. The procurement cost-based pricing policy incentivizes customers with low delay-
sensitivity to choose later completion times, giving the utility firm the opportunity to charge vehicles
when the cost of charging is lower. This results in substantial cost savings, compared to charging
vehicles as soon as possible. For example, in the PJM Interconnect, average cost savings across the
days in a typical summer month are approximately 20%. We also find that this policy avoids the
use of less energy-efficient power plants in the PJM Interconnect (because these plants are usually
more costly), resulting in an average emissions savings of approximately 15%. That is, from a policy
perspective, allowing utility firms to own and operate charging stations can lead to reductions in
both cost and emissions. Finally, most of these reductions can be achieved by implementing smart
charging during a few peak-demand days in a month, making customers more receptive to smart
charging and highlighting its practical relevance.
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2. Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on smart-city operations by studying the electri-
fication of urban mobility (for reviews, see Mak 2018, Hasija et al. 2019, and Qi and Shen 2019).
Recent papers have studied various problems in this context. For example, Qi et al. (2018) ana-
lyze how a service provider can jointly use its own fleet and excess capacity from shared mobility
providers (e.g., Uber drivers) for last-mile delivery. Moreover, electric vehicles have received par-
ticular attention in recent years. Mak et al. (2013) and Avci et al. (2014) study battery switching
business model where a service provider leases fully charged batteries to vehicle owners by switching
them with depleted ones. We complement these papers by studying the charging station business
model (where customers own their batteries), which is now more common than battery switching
stations. Chocteau et al. (2011) analyze adoption of electric vehicles in commercial fleets. Lim et
al. (2015) show that fast charging reduces range anxiety of customers, whereas leasing batteries
can increase adoption as well as profitability under high resale anxiety. Instead of focusing on
adoption, we focus on a service provider’s (i.e., a utility firm’s) charging decisions. For a fleet of
electric vehicles that are shared by customers, He et al. (2017) determine service regions to maxi-
mize coverage while keeping costs low, He et al. (2019) jointly optimize infrastructure planning and
repositioning, and Zhang et al. (2019) determine service regions and optimize charging/discharging
schedules of these shared vehicles. Sha et al. (2019) investigate how autonomous electric vehi-
cles can provide grid services as well as mobility to customers. Unlike these papers, we consider
the interaction between delay-sensitive owners of electric vehicles and charging stations which face
time-varying electricity cost. In doing so, we consider the key tradeoff between the charging cost
and the inconvenience cost to identify the economic and environmental benefits of smart charging.
Our paper also contributes to the energy related-operations literature, which has investigated
several topics, including integration of renewable energy with conventional sources (Wu and Ka-
puscinski 2013 and Zhou et al. 2019), effects of electricity pricing policies on consumption and
investments (Ata et al. 2018 and Ko¨k et al. 2018), supply function equilibrium in wholesale elec-
tricity markets (Al-Gwaiz et al. 2016 and Sunar and Birge 2019), and capacity investments in
renewable and conventional sources (Hu et al. 2015 and Ko¨k et al. 2019). Our paper is also related
to the literature on energy storage operations. Wu et al. (2012) propose a heuristic for managing
seasonal energy storage, Zhou et al. (2016) show the importance of negative electricity prices in
operating a storage facility, and Kapuscinski et al. (2019) characterize how to operate storage fa-
cilities in an electricity network and how much to invest in these facilities so as to minimize the
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cost of matching supply with demand. Different from the large-scale storage facilities studied in
these papers, batteries in electric vehicles are owned by customers and their primary goal is to
provide mobility. Therefore, a utility firm needs to offer incentives to customers to manage charg-
ing operations. Our paper identifies how the utility firm can incentivize customers with different
delay-sensitivity to agree to different charging completion times, thus reducing the cost of charging
and passing (part of) cost savings to customers.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study smart charging of electric vehicles by
a utility firm. In doing so, we propose an easy-to-implement policy for solving the complex, dynamic
control problem of determining how much to charge each vehicle at a given time to minimize the
charging cost. We also determine how a utility firm should announce charging prices for given
completion times to either minimize total cost or maximize its profit. Our numerical analysis
demonstrates that smart charging leads to significant cost and emissions savings, providing both
economic and environmental benefits.
3. Model
We develop a sequential game between a utility firm and a set of customers with electric vehicles.
First, the utility firm announces pairs of charging price and completion time. Then, each customer
selects the pair that maximizes his/her utility, which decreases in the charging price, completion
time, and the customer’s sensitivity to delay. We consider the two main types of utility firms—public
and investor-owned. The public utility firm minimizes the sum of charging cost and inconvenience
cost of customers due to delay. The investor-owned utility firm (referred to as private utility firm
hereafter for brevity) maximizes the revenue from customers minus the charging cost. Both types of
utility firms satisfy the electricity demand caused by charging, in addition to the electricity demand
from other sources (e.g., residential customers). Denote the utility firm’s planning horizon as [0, T ],
where T is typically 12 to 24 hours. We index customers that arrive at a representative charging
station in the utility firm’s service area during t ∈ [0, T ] by n = {1, · · · , N}, where N is the total
number of customers. We provide the details of our model below. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.1 Customers
To focus on the key tradeoff between electric vehicle charging cost and inconvenience cost due to
delay, we first consider a model in which all N customers arrive simultaneously at a charging station
at time t = 0, i.e., no customers arrive during t ∈ (0, T ]. We consider non-simultaneous arrivals in
Section 6. For simplicity, we assume that each customer needs the same amount of energy, which
is normalized to one unit without loss of generality. We let the maximum charging speed be a.
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Thus, the minimum charging time is w = 1/a. For example, if one unit of energy is 20 kWh and
the maximum charging speed is a = 6.67 kW, the minimum charging time is w = 3 hours.
For a given charging price p and completion time τ ≥ w, a customer’s utility from the charging
service is
u(θ, p, τ) = u0 − p− θδ(τ), (1)
where u0 is a baseline utility (when the price is zero and charging is completed without delay),
which does not affect optimization and is assumed to be the same for all customers, δ(τ) is the
disutility, which increases in the completion time τ , and θ is the customer’s sensitivity to delay.
Customers are heterogeneous with respect to the delay-sensitivity parameter θ and can be
divided into I classes, which can be ordered from low to high delay-sensitivity such that θ(1) <
θ(2) < · · · < θ(I). For a customer n, θn takes the value θ(i) with probability β(i) for i = {1, · · · , I}
such that
∑I
i=1 β
(i) = 1. A customer’s delay-sensitivity is the customer’s private information, which
is unobservable to the utility firm.
Before arrival, customers’ delay-sensitivity levels {θ1, · · · , θN} realize independently and after
arrival, each customer observes the pairs of charging price and completion time
{(
p(i), τ (i)
)
: i = 1, . . . , I
}
announced by the utility firm. Each customer chooses the pair that maximizes his/her utility given
in (1). Formally, customers in class i with delay-sensitivity θ(i) choose the pair
(
p(j
∗), τ (j
∗)) such that
j∗ = arg max
j
u(θ(i), p(j), τ (j)). (2)
The utility firm announces the pairs such that
(
p(i), τ (i)
)
maximizes the utility of a customer with
delay sensitivity θ(i). Therefore, j∗ = i in (2). That is, for n = 1, . . . , N , customer n chooses
charging price pn and completion time τn such that
if θn = θ
(i), then pn = p
(i) and τn = τ
(i). (3)
3.2 Utility Firm
There are two types of utility firms: public and private. Public utility firms are either owned by the
government or by the customers in their service regions (as electric cooperatives), and they account
for 25 percent of the electricity sales in the U.S. (Lazar 2016, pp. 11,12). Their objective is to serve
their constituents (i.e., customers) at the minimum cost (EIA 2007 and DOE 2015, p. 27). On the
other hand, private utility firms are owned by investors and their objective is to maximize their
profits, subject to regulations imposed by state and federal governments (DOE 2015, p. 27). These
regulations impose constraints on private utility firms in setting retail prices of electricity (Cawley
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and Kennard 2018, p. 2). However, given the novelty of electric vehicle charging service, private
utilities are not constrained in setting charging prices, which they perceive as a new business model
to increase their profits (Baker et al. 2019).
To reflect the above practice, for both utility firms, we formulate a two-stage optimization
problem. In the first stage, by announcing pairs of charging price and completion time, a public
utility firm minimizes the sum of the expected cost of inconvenience to customers (due to delay)
and the expected cost of charging, whereas a private utility firm maximizes its expected profit, i.e.,
the revenue from customers minus the cost of charging. Both types of utility firms choose the pairs{(
p(i), τ (i)
)
: i = 1, . . . , I
}
such that a customer with delay sensitivity θ(i) finds it optimal to use
the charging service and choose the pair
(
p(i), τ (i)
)
. That is, both types of firms are subject to
individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints in choosing the pairs.
In the second stage, given the completion times chosen by customers, both public and private
utility firms decide the charging amount for each customer over time to minimize the total cost of
charging N vehicles. We formulate the second-stage problem next.
Let an(t) ∈ [0, a] for t ∈ [0, T ] denote the charging speed for customer n’s electric vehicle at
time t, where a is the maximum possible charging speed. The total electricity demand due to
charging electric vehicles at time t is
q(t) =
N∑
n=1
an(t). (4)
Let d(t) denote the utility firm’s electricity demand from other sources (excluding electric vehicle
charging) at time t, and let c˜(q) be the cost of procuring (or producing) q units of electricity.
Consistent with the practice (see Figure 3) and the literature (e.g., Wu and Kapuscinski 2013 and
Ko¨k et al. 2018), we assume that c˜(q) is convex in q. Given that the cost of meeting demand d(t)
without electric vehicles is c˜(d(t)), the incremental cost due to vehicle charging is
c(q(t)|d(t)) = c˜(d(t) + q(t))− c˜(d(t)), (5)
where q(t) is defined in (4). Because c˜(·) is convex, c(q(t)|d(t)) is also convex in q(t) for a given d(t)
so that the firm can reduce its charging cost by smoothing the total demand d(t) + q(t) over
time t ∈ [0, T ]. The firm minimizes the cost of charging electric vehicles by choosing the charg-
ing schedule {an(t), n = 1, . . . , N} for given charging completion times {τ1, . . . , τN} selected by
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customers. Let C(τ1, . . . , τN ) denote the minimum charging cost, which is given by:
C(τ1, . . . , τN )
.
= min
{an(t), n=1,...,N}
∫ T
0
c
(
q(t)|d(t))dt (6)
s.t.
∫ τn
0
an(t) dt = 1, ∀n = 1, . . . , N, (7)
q(t) =
N∑
n=1
an(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (8)
0 ≤ an(t) ≤ a, ∀t ∈ [0, τn], ∀n = 1, . . . , N, (9)
an(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ (τn, T ], ∀n = 1, . . . , N, (10)
where (7) ensures that customer n’s electric vehicle is charged with one unit of energy by the
customer’s chosen completion time τn, (8) defines the total electricity demand due to charging
electric vehicles, (9) and (10) ensure that a customer’s vehicle is only charged before the charging
completion time of the customer within the charging speed limit. Given the minimum charging cost
by the solution of the second-stage problem (6)-(10), we next formulate the utility firm’s first-stage
problem.
As discussed in Section 3.1, a utility firm cannot observe customer n’s delay-sensitivity θn, but
it is reasonable to assume that the firm knows the distribution of θ across customers. That is, from
the firm’s perspective, the delay sensitivity of customer n, denoted by θn, is a random variable that
takes value θ(i) with probability β(i). Accordingly, the public utility firm’s problem of minimizing
the sum of the expected inconvenience and charging costs can be written as
min
{(τ (i)∈[w,T ],p(i)), i=1,...,I}
E{θn, n=1,...,N}
[
N∑
n=1
θnδ(τn) + C(τ1, . . . , τN )
]
, (11)
where E{θn, n=1,...,N}[·] denotes the expectation over all N customers’ delay sensitivities and cus-
tomer n chooses the charging price and completion time pair (pn, τn) that maximizes his/her utility
as given in (2)-(3), which represent incentive compatibility constraints. The utility firm is also
subject to individual rationality constraints for each delay-sensitivity class:
u0 − θ(i)δ(τ (i))− p(i) ≥ u, ∀i = 1, . . . , I, (12)
where u corresponds to the reservation utility.
In contrast, a private utility firm maximizes its expected profit
max
{(τ (i)∈[w,T ],p(i)), i=1,...,I}
E{θn, n=1,...,N}
[
N∑
n=1
pn − C(τ1, . . . , τN )
]
, (13)
subject to (12), where (pn, τn) are defined in (2)-(3).
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4. Optimal Charging Schedule Given Completion Times
We begin our analysis by considering the second-stage problem of finding the optimal charging
schedule that minimizes the cost of charging electric vehicles for given completion times. Recall
that this problem is given in (6)-(10) and it is common for both public and private utility firms.
This is a continuous-time, optimal control problem, and it can be expressed in the standard form
(see the proof of Proposition 1) with state variables xn(t) =
∫ t
0
an(s) ds, where xn(t) corresponds
to the level of electricity charged to vehicle n by time t. An interesting feature of this problem is
that constraint (7) imposes terminal conditions xn(τn) = 1, for n = 1, . . . , N , which imply that the
number of controls decreases by one as time t exceeds τn. Moreover, there are N control variables
and N state variables, where N can be large, requiring an easy-to-implement and effective policy
to compute the solution.
We devise such a policy by taking advantage of the charging problem’s special structure, i.e.,
the convexity of the electricity procurement cost function. This policy yields one optimal solution
for a given sequence of completion times. In this policy, we denote the total demand by L(t) and
initially set it to be d(t), the external electricity demand (i.e., excluding charging electric vehicles).
In each iteration, we determine one electric vehicle’s charging schedule, and update L(t) to include
the demand from this vehicle’s schedule. When the procedure finishes, L(t) becomes the total
electricity demand, including the demand from charging N vehicles. We present this policy below,
where we sort customers such that τN ≤ τN−1 ≤ · · · ≤ τ1 without loss of generality.
Juice-filling policy
Step 1. Initialize n = N and L(t) = d(t) over [0, T ].
Step 2. Find zn such that ∫ τn
0
min
{(
zn − L(t)
)+
, a
}
dt = 1. (14)
Step 3. Set an(t) = min
{(
zn − L(t)
)+
, a
}
for t ∈ [0, τn].
Step 4. Update L(t) to be L(t) + an(t) for t ∈ [0, τn]. If n = 1, then stop. Otherwise, decrease n
by 1 and go to step 2.
We refer to the above policy as “juice-filling policy” because it resembles the procedure of
filling N containers with juice, where each container represents the battery of an electric vehicle
and the juice represents the electricity that is charged to the vehicle’s battery. The fill-up-to level zn
can be interpreted as the “juice surface level” after filling a container, as illustrated in Figure 1,
where we show the first two iterations of the policy for the special case in which the electricity
8
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demand d(t) from other sources is constant over time t ∈ [0, T ] and is given as d(t) = D.1 The
vertical axis plots the total electricity demand and the horizontal axis plots the time. We consider
five electric vehicles (i.e., N = 5) with given completion times τ5 ≤ τ4 ≤ · · · ≤ τ1.
Figure 1: (Color online) Juice-filling policy, first two iterations
EV 5
Electricity
Demand
𝐿(𝑡)
𝜏50
Time
𝐷
EV 4
EV 5
𝐿(𝑡)
𝜏50 𝜏4
Time
𝑧5
ത𝑎
ത𝑎
𝑧4
ത𝑎
First Iteration (𝑛 = 5) Second Iteration (𝑛 = 4)
Electricity
Demand
Notes. We illustrate the first two iterations of the juice-filling policy for the special case when the demand from
other sources, d(t), is constant over time.
The left panel in Figure 1 illustrates the first iteration: we construct a container (highlighted
in bold lines) from time t = 0 to t = τ5. The container’s base L(t) is at the demand level D and its
height is a, the maximum charging speed. We fill this container with one unit of juice, which fills
the container up to z5. This juice surface level can be computed by (14). The charging policy is
then to set a5(t) = z5 −D for t ∈ [0, τ5]. Before proceeding to the next electric vehicle, we update
L(t) to L(t) + a5(t).
The right panel in Figure 1 illustrates the second iteration: we construct a new container
(highlighted in bold) from time t = 0 to t = τ4, such that its base decreases from L(t) = z5 for
t ∈ [0, τ5] to L(t) = D for t ∈ (τ5, τ4]. The top of the container is a units above its base. One unit
of juice brings the juice surface level to z4, which can be computed by (14). The charging policy
is then to set a4(t) = z4 − L(t) for t ∈ [0, τ5] and a4(t) = a for t ∈ (τ5, τ4]. We update L(t) to
L(t) + a4(t) and proceed to the next container for the next vehicle. The resulting charging policy
1Note that the policy is optimal even if d(t) is nonstationary. See Proposition 1.
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for the five electric vehicles is given in Figure 2.
Figure 2: (Color online) Juice-filling policy
1
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Proposition 1 Given external demand d(t), the control policy {a1(t), . . . , aN (t)} found by the
juice-filling policy is an optimal solution to the charging cost minimization problem in (6)-(10).
Proposition 1 shows that juice-filling policy is optimal even if the electricity demand from other
sources, d(t), is nonstationary. Intuitively, this policy smooths the total demand d(t)+q(t) in every
iteration in a greedy fashion. This leads to a total demand that is as smooth as possible over time, as
indicated by the total demand (highlighted in bold) in Figure 2. Note that minimizing the charging
cost is equivalent to minimizing the utility firm’s cost of serving total demand given external
demand d(t). This is because the objective function given in (6) is equal to the cost of serving total
demand
∫ T
0 c˜(d(t) + q(t))dt minus the cost of satisfying the external demand
∫ T
0 c˜(d(t))dt, where
the latter is a constant that does not affect the optimization. Accordingly, the objective function
can be replaced by the cost of serving the total demand. Given that c˜(·) is a convex function, the
total cost is minimized by smoothing the total demand d(t) + q(t) as much as possible, as done by
the juice-filling policy.
The juice-filling policy identifies only one of the optimal solutions to the charging problem given
in (6)-(10). There clearly exists (infinitely many) other charging schedules that also achieve the
same optimal total demand over time thus attaining the minimum charging cost. Compared to other
optimal schedules, the juice-filling policy greatly simplifies the computation due to its sequential
nature of determining the charging schedule. Juice-filling is an easy-to-implement, intuitive, and
effective policy for finding the solution of a complicated problem. This makes the policy particularly
10
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suitable for practical use. Note that the optimality of the juice-filling policy to the charging problem
relies on the assumption that all customers arrive simultaneously. This policy can be generalized
for non-simultaneous arrivals, as we shall show in Section 6.
We close this section by investigating structural properties of the optimal charging cost function
C(τ1, . . . , τN ) under given completion times.
Lemma 1 (i) If {b1, . . . , bN} is any permutation of {1, . . . , N}, then C(τb1 , . . . , τbN ) = C(τ1, . . . , τN ).
(ii) The optimal charging cost C(τ1, . . . , τN ) decreases in the completion time τn for any given n.
Lemma 1 first shows that the optimal charging cost remains the same for any permutation of
completion times. This is because each electric vehicle is assumed to have the same demand for
electricity. The second part of the lemma indicates that earlier completion times increase the cost
of charging electric vehicles. This is because if the utility firm needs to complete charging earlier,
it may need to incur a higher cost for procuring electricity. Given that earlier completion times
decrease customers’ inconvenience cost, this result formalizes the tradeoff between the charging
cost and the inconvenience cost. We investigate this tradeoff in the next section to characterize
the optimal charging prices for given completion times. Finally, we remark that the charging cost
function C(τ1, τ2, . . . , τN ) is generally not convex in τn for any n.
5. Optimal Charging Prices and Completion Times
Given the optimal charging schedule determined by the juice-filling policy, we next consider the
utility firm’s first-stage problem of announcing pairs of charging price and completion time to
customers. We characterize the properties of the optimal completion times and charging prices.
5.1 Public Utility Firm
Consider a public utility firm’s problem given in (11)-(12). This is a complicated problem due to the
nonconvexity of the objective function (11) because the charging cost C(τ1, . . . , τN ) characterized
in Section 4 is not convex and it cannot be expressed in closed-form. Nevertheless, we can reduce
the search space for optimal charging prices and completion times significantly by Lemma 2 and
Proposition 2 below, where we denote the optimal completion time for customer class i by τ (i)
∗
.
Lemma 2 There exists a set of optimal completion times that satisfy τ (1)∗ ≥ τ (2)∗ ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I)∗.
Recall that customer classes are ordered by delay sensitivity from low to high such that θ(1) <
θ(2) < · · · < θ(I) (see Section 3.1). Accordingly, Lemma 2 implies that the utility firm should
offer the optimal pairs of charging price and completion time such that customers that are more
11
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sensitive to delay choose earlier completion times. This result shows that to find the optimal pairs,
it is sufficient to only consider charging completion times that are decreasing in the delay sensitivity
of customers. We next construct the optimal pricing scheme {p(1), . . . , p(I)} for given completion
times τ (1)∗ ≥ τ (2)∗ ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I)∗. This pricing scheme in fact implements any decreasing completion
times τ (1) ≥ τ (2) ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I).
Proposition 2 Given a set of completion times such that τ (1) ≥ τ (2) ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I), for a public
utility firm, the following procedure constructs a pricing scheme such that a customer with delay
sensitivity θ(i) chooses charging price p(i) and completion time τ (i):
Set p(I) ≤ u0 − θ(I)δ(τ (I))− u and for i = I − 1, I − 2, . . . , 1, choose p(i) such that
p(i) ∈ [p(i+1) − θ(i+1)(δ(τ (i))− δ(τ (i+1))), p(i+1) − θ(i)(δ(τ (i))− δ(τ (i+1)))]. (15)
Proposition 2 reveals an important managerial insight that a utility firm should set prices for
charging electric vehicles in accordance with the cost of inconvenience. This inconvenience-cost
based pricing policy incentivizes customers to agree to smart charging (i.e., delaying completion
times) in contrast to the current practice of charging vehicles as soon as possible (SEPA 2017). In
particular, when a customer in delay-sensitivity class i agrees to a later completion time (compared
to the more delay-sensitive class i+ 1), then the customer’s price discount should be based on the
increased inconvenience cost. Formally, if τ (i) > τ (i+1), then
p(i+1) − p(i) ∈ [θ(i)(δ(τ (i))− δ(τ (i+1))), θ(i+1)(δ(τ (i))− δ(τ (i+1)))]. (16)
We next show that this insight holds for a private utility firm as well.
5.2 Private Utility Firm
Consider a private utility firm’s problem in Section 3.2 for which Lemma 2 continues to hold, i.e.,
there exists a set of optimal completion times, where τ (1)∗ ≥ τ (2)∗ ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I)∗. We next construct
a pricing scheme that achieves any decreasing completion times for the private utility firm.
Proposition 3 Given a set of completion times such that τ (1) ≥ τ (2) ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I), for a private
utility firm, the following procedure constructs a pricing scheme that maximizes its profit and a
customer with delay sensitivity θ(i) chooses charging price p(i) and completion time τ (i):
Set p(I) = u0 − θ(I)δ(τ (I))− u and for i = I − 1, I − 2, . . . , 1, choose p(i) such that
p(i) = p(i+1) − θ(i)(δ(τ (i))− δ(τ (i+1))). (17)
Compared to the prices of the public utility firm in Proposition 2, Proposition 3 reveals that
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the private firm should set the prices at their upper bounds so as to maximize its profit. Moreover,
the firm should set prices such that each customer should be indifferent between choosing the
completion time designed for his/her class and the completion time for the next class with higher
delay-sensitivity. Formally, (17) implies
θ(i)δ(τ (i)) + p(i) = θ(i)δ(τ (i+1)) + p(i+1), (18)
so that a customer with delay sensitivity θ(i) is indifferent between choosing the pair
(
p(i), τ (i)
)
designed for his/her class and the pair
(
p(i+1), τ (i+1)
)
designed for those with delay sensitivity θ(i+1).
Another important difference between a public and a private utility firm is in the information
rent. Although a public utility firm pays information rent, it considers this as a transfer payment. A
private utility firm considers information rent as an additional cost. We highlight this difference by
rewriting the private utility firm’s objective function (13), using the prices derived in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 The private utility firm’s objective function in (13) can be rewritten as
min
{τ (i)∈[w,T ], i=1,...,I}
E{θn, n=1,...,N}
[
N∑
n=1
θnδ(τn) + C(τ1, . . . , τN )
]
+N
I∑
i=1
β(i)
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(τ (j+1)),
where the expected value term is the public utility firm’s cost in (11) and the second term is the
expected value of the information rent incurred by the private utility firm.
Proposition 4 reveals that the information rent can potentially distort the private firm’s decision
on charging completion times. That is, compared to the public utility firm, the private utility firm
may choose earlier completion times at higher charging prices, or later completion times at lower
prices. The direction of the distortion depends on the cost function and customers’ sensitivity
to delay. The industry regulator or policymakers (see Section 3.2) would be concerned about the
magnitude of the distortion, which we shall estimate in Section 7.
We next provide the intuition behind the information rent term by considering the special case
where delay sensitivity follows a discrete uniform distribution with β(i) = 1I for i = 1, . . . , I. In
this case, the information rent term simplifies to NI
I∑
i=2
(i− 1) (θ(i) − θ(i−1)) δ(τ (i)) (see the proof of
Proposition 4). Because customers in class I have the highest delay sensitivity θ(I), they receive
the reservation utility u (see Proposition 3). Accordingly, the private utility firm does not incur an
information rent for this class.2 Consider a customer in class i < I and let the customer’s disutility
2Customers in class I with the highest delay sensitivity θ(I) receive the lowest information rent among all classes
under pricing schemes of both the public and private utility firms (see Propositions 2 and 3). This is different from
the majority of the literature in which the highest class gets the highest information rent. This is because in the
literature, a customer’s utility typically increases in the customer’s private information, whereas in our model a
customer’s utility decreases in θ.
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of inconvenience δ(τ (i)) increase by one unit and customer’s price p(i) decrease by θ(i) units. Then,
the customer in class i maintains the same utility as before these changes. If a customer in class i−1
chooses the pair (p(i), τ (i)) under these changes, then by using (18) it can be seen that the customer’s
inconvenience cost increases by θ(i−1) while enjoying a price decrease of θ(i), resulting in a net gain
of θ(i) − θ(i−1). To maintain incentive compatibility, one unit increase in δ(τ (i)) should not only
lead to a decrease in p(i−1) by θ(i), but also decreases in each of the prices {p(j), j = 1, 2 . . . , i− 1}
by θ(i)−θ(i−1). That is, one unit increase in δ(τ (i)) should be traded off against (i−1)(θ(i)−θ(i−1))
units of revenue loss, which is exactly the expression for the information rent.
6. Non-simultaneous Arrivals of Customers
In this section, we extend our model to a more general setting, where customers may arrive at
the charging station at different times. In Section 6.1, we show that compared to the main model,
finding the optimal charging schedule is more complicated under non-simultaneous arrivals, but the
results in Section 5 on optimal pairs of charging price and completion times continue to apply. In
Section 6.2, we characterize the optimal schedule as a threshold policy. Given the computational
complexity of this optimal policy, we generalize the juice-filling policy for non-simultaneous arrivals.
6.1 Utility Firm’s Problem
We first reformulate the utility firm’s second-stage problem. Let sn be the arrival time of cus-
tomer n. In the main model in Section 3, sn = 0 for all customers. The utility firm’s second-stage
problem of minimizing the charging cost is given as
C(τ1, . . . , τN )
.
= min
{an(t), n=1,...,N}
∫ T
0
c
(
q(t)|d(t))dt (19)
s.t.
∫ τn
sn
an(t) dt = 1, ∀n = 1, . . . , N, (20)
q(t) =
N∑
n=1
an(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (21)
0 ≤ an(t) ≤ a, ∀t ∈ [sn, τn],∀n = 1, . . . , N, (22)
an(t) = 0, ∀t 6∈ [sn, τn],∀n = 1, . . . , N. (23)
If sn = 0 for n = 1, 2, . . . , N , then the above formulation is equivalent to the second-stage problem
of the main model, given in (6)-(10).
As in the main model, given the optimal cost of charging, a public utility firm minimizes the total
cost (11) subject to constraints (12) by announcing pairs of charging price and completion time.
The only difference from the main model is that a customer’s utility is u(θ, p, τ) = u0−p−θδ(τ−s),
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where s is the arrival time of the customer (s = 0 in (1)). A private utility firm maximizes its
profit (13) by announcing pairs. Each customer selects the pair that maximizes his/her utility, which
corresponds to the incentive compatibility constraints. Given that both utility firms’ first-stage
problems remain the same under non-simultaneous arrivals, the results obtained for simultaneous
arrivals in Section 5 continue to apply. That is, the public and private utility firms should set
the pairs of charging price and completion times as given in Propositions 2 and 3, respectively.
However, the second-stage problem under non-simultaneous arrivals is more involved as we analyze
below.
In the following analysis, we assume that the arrival time of each customer sn is exogenously
given and it is public information. That is, we do not consider the case in which customers need
to consider a matrix of pairs of charging price and completion time to strategically determine their
arrival times. This assumption ensures tractability and isolates the tradeoff between inconvenience
cost and charging cost, allowing us to generate insights which can be of value for the case in which
arrival times depend on prices.
6.2 Charging Schedule Under Given Completion Times
We next solve the second-stage problem of minimizing the charging cost under given completion
times, which is a common problem for both public and private utility firms. To do so, we first
pool and sort arrival and completion times of N customers in the ascending order and label them
as tj such that 0 = t1 = s1 < t2 < · · · < t2N < T . Thus, the problem horizon consists of 2N time
intervals: [t1, t2], (t2, t3], · · · , (t2N , T ]. Let I(t) be the set of electric vehicles that are present at
the charging station at time t, i.e., I(t) .= {k | t ∈ [sk, τk]}.
Unlike the simultaneous-arrival case in Section 4, where there exists an optimal policy that can
be implemented by the juice-filling procedure with only one juice surface level (or fill-up-to level) zn
for each vehicle n during the problem horizon t ∈ [0, T ], in the case of non-simultaneous arrivals, we
shall show that there exists an optimal policy that can be characterized by one juice-surface-level
zn,j for each time interval (tj , tj+1] for every vehicle n such that there are potentially different zn,j ’s
during the problem horizon t ∈ [0, T ] for vehicle n. That is, these juice surface levels may change
across time intervals. They can be determined via the optimization problem given in (A.19)-(A.21)
in the Appendix. Because these thresholds are scalars, computing them is simpler than computing
the an(t) functions in the original problem (19)-(23). For given zn,j ’s, the charging policy is as
follows.
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Charging policy for non-simultaneous arrivals (given zn,j’s)
Step 1. Initialize j = 1 and L(t) = d(t) for t ∈ [0, T ].
Step 2. Set n = arg mink{τk|k ∈ I(tj)}, which is the electric vehicle with the earliest completion
time in the feasible set I(tj).
Step 3. Set an(t) = min
{(
zn,j − L(t)
)+
, a
}
for t ∈ [tj , tj+1].
Step 4. Replace L(t) by L(t)+an(t) for t ∈ [tj , tj+1]. If n = arg maxk{τk|k ∈ I(tj)} and j = 2N−1,
then stop; if n = arg maxk{τk|k ∈ I(tj)} but j < 2N − 1, increase j by 1 and go to step 2;
otherwise, increase n by 1 and go to step 3.
The above charging policy is similar to the juice-filling policy within each time interval because
by construction, neither an arrival nor a charging completion occurs during the open time-interval
(tj , tj+1). Accordingly, the charging amount in Step 3 above is equivalent to that in Step 3 of the
juice-filling policy. We next prove that there exits zn,j ’s such that this policy is optimal.
Proposition 5 Given external demand d(t), there exists {zn,j : n = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , 2N − 1}
such that the control policy {a1(t), . . . , aN (t)} found by the above charging policy for non-simultaneous
arrivals is an optimal solution to the charging cost minimization problem in (19)-(23).
Although the optimal charging policy can be characterized as described above, threshold zn,j ’s
still must be optimized jointly by solving (A.19)-(A.21) in the Appendix. As the number of electric
vehicles increases, such an optimization problem becomes challenging to solve, making it practically
intractable to solve the first-stage problem of evaluating the cost of charging many electric vehicles
and announcing optimal charging prices and completion times. We next design a computationally
efficient and intuitive charging policy for the utility firm by generalizing the juice-filling policy
introduced in Section 4 to accommodate non-simultaneous arrivals. We use {aGn (t) : t ∈ [sn, τn], n =
1, . . . , N} to denote the charging schedule under this policy.
Generalized juice-filling policy
Step 1. Initialize n = 1 and L(t) = d(t) for t ∈ [0, T ].
Step 2. Find zn such that ∫ τn
sn
min
{(
zn − L(t)
)+
, a
}
dt = 1. (24)
Step 3. Set aGn (t) = min
{(
zn − L(t)
)+
, a
}
for t ∈ [sn, τn].
Step 4. Replace L(t) by L(t) + aGn (t) for t ∈ [sn, τn]. If n = N , then stop. Otherwise, increase n
by 1 and go to step 2.
16
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479455 
The above policy is equivalent to the juice-filling policy if sn = 0 for each customer n. As in
the juice-filling policy, the thresholds above are defined for each charging time interval and can be
computed sequentially in closed-form (see Step 2). Therefore, the generalized juice-filling policy
is much more efficient to compute compared to the optimal policy which relies on threshold zn,j ’s
that are difficult to compute.
The generalized juice filling policy is likely to perform well in determining the charging schedule
for a large number of vehicles. Recall that this policy smooths the demand in a greedy fashion in
each iteration. Intuitively, as the number of electric vehicles increases, the policy is run for more
iterations, so the demand is likely to be smoothed as much as possible. As we illustrate in the next
section, using generalized juice-filling policy already enables a utility firm to achieve significant cost
savings through smart charging, compared to the current practice of charging vehicles as soon as
possible.
7. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we illustrate our findings by using real electricity demand and supply data. We
quantify the economic and environmental implications of smart charging for a private and public
utility firm, considering both cases of simultaneous and non-simultaneous arrivals of customers.
We focus on the PJM Interconnect, the largest wholesale electricity market in the U.S., which
serves 65 million customers across thirteen states (PJM 2018, p. 24). We estimate the cost of procur-
ing q units of electricity, i.e., c˜(q) in (5), by constructing the supply curve for PJM (see Figure 3).
We use the hourly electricity demand data for each day of August 2016. We subtract the hourly
generation of renewable sources from the electricity demand to obtain the net electricity demand,
which is satisfied by conventional sources. We then estimate the generation cost of these conven-
tional sources by using the Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID) of
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2019). eGRID provides detailed information for each
of the 448 conventional power plants in the PJM Interconnect, including the heat rate (the amount
of thermal energy needed to generate one unit of electrical energy, given in MMBTU/kWh) and
nameplate capacity (the theoretical maximum power output of a generator, given in MW).
By multiplying the heat rate with the cost of the fuel source of a power plant (given by EIA 2017
as $/MMBTU), we calculate the plant’s cost of generating electricity (given in $/kWh). We convert
the nameplate capacity to effective capacity for each plant by multiplying the plant’s nameplate
capacity with the equivalent availability factor (provided by NERC 2019), which accounts for
the unavailability due to planned outages for maintenance. We then sort the power plants in
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the increasing order of their generation costs, which gives a supply curve but does not take into
account unplanned outages (due to reliability problems). To account for these, we calibrate the
supply curve by multiplying the capacity with a daily scaling factor αm ≤ 1 for each day m. We
find the factor αm by minimizing the sum of squared differences between the realized electricity
price and the estimated electricity price (based on the adjusted supply curve and the net demand).
Figure 3 illustrates the calibrated supply curve for August 25, 2016.
In addition to the cost data, eGRID provides emissions intensity of each conventional power
plant, which we use to estimate environmental implications of smart charging. We finally note
that, in our numerical analysis, we consider 2,500 electrical vehicles with a daily energy demand of
50 MWh (see Section 7.2). To better illustrate our results, we scale down both the supply curve
and the external demand by a factor of 1,000, so that the demand from electric vehicle charging is
approximately 2% of the total electricity demand.
Figure 3: (Color online) Supply curve for August 25, 2016
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Notes. The above figure is based on The PJM Interconnect. Each circle represents a power plant with its generation
cost on the vertical axis and the cumulative capacity up to that plant on the horizontal axis. The size of a circle is
proportional to the plant’s capacity.
We next estimate customers’ waiting cost. Incentivizing customers to wait longer to reduce
the cost of charging electric vehicles is a novel business idea and, therefore, there is no prior study
that has directly estimated the waiting cost in such a context. It is reasonable to assume that the
waiting cost varies significantly across customers. For example, Aks¸in et al. (2013) estimate that
for a call center, the customers’ waiting cost varies from a negligible level to approximately $1 per
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minute and they consider three classes of customers. We also consider a wide range of waiting cost,
reflected by the heterogeneity in customers’ sensitivity to delays, and we assume that there are five
classes of delay-sensitivity. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the waiting cost is convex
in the waiting time, i.e., a longer wait leads to a higher marginal waiting cost, which is supported
by the psychology literature (Osuna 1985).
For our numerical analysis, we assume that each customer needs to charge 20 kWh for their
electric vehicle and each charging station can provide a maximum charging speed of 6.67 kW. Thus,
the minimum time required for charging is 3 hours. If the charging completion time τ is longer
than 3 hours, an inconvenience cost is incurred. We assume the utility function (1) is
u(θ, τ, p) = 50− θ(τ − 3)2 − p, τ ≥ 3. (25)
That is, a charging service that is longer than the 3-hour minimum time leads to an inconvenience
cost that quadratically increases in the delay. We also assume that the reservation utility is u = $40.
In fact, our numerical results depend only on u0 − u = $10, which is the customers’ willingness to
pay. This translates to 50 cents per kWh, a typical price at charging stations (Blink 2019).
We let the delay-sensitivity θ take five possible values: θ(1) = 0.1, θ(2) = 2, θ(3) = 4, θ(4) = 6,
and θ(5) = 8 with equal probabilities. These values also represent the inconvenience cost (in dollars)
for the first hour of delay. We tried expanding the range of θ to include higher waiting cost, but
those highly delay-sensitive customers are served almost without delay in the optimal solution. As
a result, their demand can be regarded as non-schedulable and included in the demand d(t) from
other sources.
7.1 Simultaneous Arrivals
We first illustrate the results in Sections 4 and 5. We consider N = 500 customers who request
charging service simultaneously, with I = 5 customer classes. We assume that there are 100
customers from each delay-sensitivity level θ(i) for i = 1, . . . , 5. That is, instead of independently
drawing each customer’s delay sensitivity from the delay-sensitivity distribution, we assume that
the same number of customers from each class request charging. This assumption simplifies the
computation and it is reasonable given that the number of customers N is much greater than the
number of customer classes I. Each class of 100 customers requires 2,000 kWh or 2 MWh. Thus,
the total energy required for charging 500 electric vehicles is 10 MWh.
Figure 4 and Table 1 compare four charging policies for electric vehicles. The utility firm’s
electricity demand (excluding electric vehicle charging) is taken from 3 p.m. to 9 p.m. on a typical
peak day. The marginal cost (the numbers below the external demand curve) during the peak
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hours is more than twice as high as that during the off-peak hours ($158/MWh versus $72/MWh).
All 500 customers request charging service at the beginning of this 6-hour period. We shall analyze
the case with non-simultaneous arrivals in Section 7.2.
Figure 4 (a) shows the as soon as possible (ASAP) charging schedule, in which all 500 electric
vehicles are charged during the first 3 hours of the 6-hour period. This corresponds to the current
practice in charging stations (SEPA 2017). The total charging demand is 3.333 MW, burdening
Figure 4: (Color online) Electric vehicle charging policies under simultaneous arrivals
(a) As soon as possible (ASAP) (b) Charging cost minimization (CCM)
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Table 1: Comparison of electric vehicle charging policies
As soon as
possible
(ASAP)
Charging cost
minimization
(CCM)
Total cost
minimization
(TCM)
Profit
maximization
(PM)
Completion times (hours)
τ (1)
τ (2)
τ (3)
τ (4)
τ (5)
3
3
3
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
5.66
4.01
3.47
3.31
3.23
5.66
3.80
3.37
3.25
3.18
Inconvenience cost ($) 0 18090 459.26 318.45
Charging cost ($) 5455.68 913.30 1765.52 2012.31
Charging cost ($ per kWh) 0.546 0.091 0.177 0.201
Total cost ($) 5455.68 19003.3 2224.78 2330.76
Prices ($)
p(1)
p(2)
p(3)
p(4)
p(5)
10
10
10
10
10
-
6.640
7.247
8.831
9.320
9.585
7.608
8.252
9.252
9.562
9.730
Total payment (= 100
5∑
i=1
p(i)) 5000 - 4162.38 4440.33
Profit (= total payment −
charging cost)
−455.68 - 2396.85 2428.01
Information rent ($)
for customers with delay
sensitivity
θ(1)
θ(2)
θ(3)
θ(4)
θ(5)
0
0
0
0
0
-
2.652
0.732
0.296
0.104
0
1.684
0.470
0.191
0.068
0
Total information rent ($) 0 - 378.36 241.23
CO2 emissions (kilograms per
kWh of EV charging)
7.312 0.904 2.007 2.741
Total CO2 emissions from
charging (metric tons)
73.12 9.04 20.07 27.41
the utility firm because the marginal cost is already very high during the first 3 hours. Under such
a policy, each kWh charged costs $0.546 on average, while customers pay $0.5 per kWh ($10 for
20 kWh as discussed earlier), leading to a loss to the charging station, as shown in Table 1. The
corresponding CO2 emissions are also high because the additional electricity used during peak hours
is mostly generated by the least efficient peaking power plants with the highest emissions intensity.
Figure 4 (b) illustrates the policy of minimizing the charging cost. All electric vehicles are
charged to smooth the total electricity demand as much as possible. The average charging cost
is only $0.091 per kWh and the emissions intensity is 0.9 kg per kWh. However, this policy is
impractical because it results in hefty inconvenience cost—so high that customers must be paid
rather than paying for charging (thus the prices are blank in Table 1). Nevertheless, we consider
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this policy to understand the cost and emissions reduction potential of smart charging.
The total cost minimization policy minimizes the sum of customers’ inconvenience cost and
charging cost, as shown in Figure 4 (c). This is the objective of a public utility firm given in (11).
From 3:00 to 5:00 p.m., the total charging demand is reduced to about half of that under ASAP
policy and the total system demand during these two hours is smoothed. Charging is delayed to
later hours when the marginal cost is lower, and the delay is allocated to various customer groups
depending on their delay sensitivity. Both the charging cost and the CO2 emissions are substantially
lower compared to the ASAP policy.
Under the total cost minimization policy, the prices shown in Table 1 are incentive compatible:
Customers who are least delay-sensitive choose to have the longest delay and pay $6.64 for charging
service as opposed to $10 under the current practice of ASAP charging. This is an example of how
the firm can pass part of the cost savings from smart charging to customers by offering lower prices.
Customers who are more sensitive to delay pay more (or save less) in exchange for less delay in
charging.
Finally, Figure 4 (d) and the last column in Table 1 reveal the solution that maximizes the
profit, which is the objective function of a private utility firm in (13). Compared to the total cost
minimization of a public utility firm, the profit maximization of a private utility firm completes
charging service slightly earlier for all customers except for the least delay-sensitive ones. The
inconvenience cost is thus reduced and the customers are willing to pay higher prices to the private
utility firm, compared to a public one. The increase in revenue ($278 or 6.7%) exceeds the cost
increase ($247 or 14%), resulting in a maximum profit of $2,428, which is only 1.3% higher than
the profit of a public utility firm; the CO2 emissions increase by 37%, because the petroleum-
fired peaking power plants are used more often and they have much higher emissions intensity.
Nevertheless, both total cost minimization and profit maximization policies are substantially better
than charging electric vehicles as soon as possible: The respective charging cost reduction is 67.6%
and 63.1% of the cost under ASAP policy, and the CO2 emissions reduction is 72.5% and 62.5%,
respectively.
In the above example, the assumption that all customers arrive simultaneously at a peak-demand
time allows us to illustrate the fundamental tradeoff between inconvenience and charging costs.
Next, we examine a more general setting in which customers arrive non-simultaneously over time.
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7.2 Non-Simultaneous Arrivals
We now consider a total of N = 2, 500 customers, arriving at 5 different times over the course of a
day: 8:00 a.m., 10:30 a.m., 1:00 p.m, 3:30 p.m., and 6:00 p.m. At each time, 500 customers arrive,
with 100 customers being of type θ(i), i = 1, . . . , 5. As in Section 7.1, each customer demands 20kWh
(thus the total energy required for charging is 50 MWh over the course of a day), and the customers’
utility function is given by (25). Note that two adjacent arrival times are 2.5 hours apart, shorter
than minimum charging time of 3 hours. This approximates the realistic situation where customers
request charging service as other vehicles are being charged. We also experimented using a finer
division of periods (e.g., 10 or 15 arrival times), and the results are found to be similar. We choose
to present the results of the simpler model for the ease of illustration (see Figure 5) as well as for
computational efficiency. The computation is demanding: For each of the 31 days in August 2016,
we optimize the charging schedule under the objectives of a public and private utility firm and
compare the results with ASAP policy.
Because the objective function of a utility firm in the first-stage problem is generally neither
convex nor concave, we employ a global search algorithm with the following constraints: (a) The
charging completion times decrease in the customers’ sensitivity to delay (Lemma 2), and (b)
For customers with the same level of delay-sensitivity, later arrivals also have later completion.
For the solution of the second-stage problem of the utility firm, we use the generalized juice-filling
policy. The computational procedure takes approximately two hours to converge to a set of optimal
completion times (with optimal charging schedule) for each day.
Below, we first present the results on the cost and emissions reductions to demonstrate the
overall benefits of incentivizing customers to delay charging their electric vehicles, and then we
illustrate these benefits by analyzing a typical peak day.
Table 2 details the cost and CO2 emissions of charging electric vehicles for each day in Au-
gust 2016 under the following policies: ASAP, total cost minimization (for a public utility firm),
and profit maximization (for a private utility firm). The charging cost varies drastically from day
to day. For two days (August 11th and 25th), the ASAP charging cost exceeds $14,000 (or $0.28
per kWh), and either total cost minimization or profit maximization policy reduces the charging
cost by over 50%. These two days also see very high electricity prices in the data: $175.65 and
$198.40 per MWh, respectively. There are five days (August 10th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 26th) for which
the ASAP charging cost ranges from $3,000 to about $6,000, the other two policies achieve a cost
reduction of 7 to 35%. There are 14 days for which they reduce cost between 2 to 4%, and for
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Table 2: Costs and emissions of electric vehicle charging for a typical summer month
Based on PJM demand and power plants data in August 2016
ASAP = Charge as soon as possible, TCM = Total cost minimization of a public utility firm, PM =
Profit maximization of a private utility firm
day
Cost of EV charging ($) CO2 emissions due to EV charging (metric tons)
ASAP TCM ASAP−TCMASAP PM
ASAP−PM
ASAP ASAP TCM
ASAP−TCM
ASAP PM
ASAP−PM
ASAP
1 2291.5 2222.6 3.01% 2225.4 2.89% 38.7 38.7 0.10% 38.7 0.12%
2 2218.6 2159.5 2.67% 2162.2 2.55% 37.7 37.6 0.37% 37.6 0.27%
3 2366.6 2304.2 2.64% 2306.8 2.53% 38.8 38.5 0.73% 38.5 0.75%
4 2011.7 1967.6 2.19% 1970.8 2.03% 35.7 35.7 -0.06% 35.7 -0.01%
5 1557.7 1557.3 0.03% 1557.3 0.03% 29.2 29.3 -0.03% 29.3 -0.03%
6 1450.9 1449.2 0.12% 1449.3 0.12% 29.1 29.1 0.07% 29.1 0.08%
7 1552.5 1551.8 0.04% 1551.8 0.04% 30.7 30.7 0.03% 30.7 0.03%
8 2891.8 2792.0 3.45% 2801.9 3.11% 40.2 40.0 0.56% 40.1 0.48%
9 2601.6 2507.6 3.61% 2513.3 3.39% 38.6 38.3 0.94% 38.3 0.86%
10 6342.7 4079.4 35.68% 4174.7 34.18% 77.8 47.1 39.45% 47.9 38.44%
11 14587.8 6454.8 55.75% 6986.5 52.11% 185.9 89.0 52.12% 98.1 47.22%
12 5257.0 3836.6 27.02% 3910.4 25.61% 63.7 45.8 28.07% 46.4 27.10%
13 3953.4 3611.4 8.65% 3622.9 8.36% 48.2 43.7 9.30% 43.8 9.10%
14 2186.1 2139.4 2.14% 2142.4 2.00% 36.9 36.6 0.89% 36.6 0.78%
15 1625.6 1625.0 0.03% 1625.1 0.03% 31.4 31.4 0.07% 31.4 0.07%
16 2557.1 2477.5 3.11% 2480.8 2.98% 38.6 38.5 0.34% 38.5 0.29%
17 2900.2 2788.8 3.84% 2798.2 3.52% 39.5 39.2 0.90% 39.2 0.85%
18 3439.8 3144.0 8.60% 3159.7 8.14% 43.8 41.0 6.34% 41.1 6.07%
19 1745.4 1741.2 0.25% 1741.3 0.24% 33.9 33.8 0.09% 33.8 0.09%
20 1619.8 1619.1 0.04% 1619.2 0.04% 31.1 31.1 0.05% 31.1 0.05%
21 1209.6 1209.6 0.00% 1209.6 0.00% 26.5 26.5 -0.01% 26.5 -0.01%
22 1440.4 1438.6 0.13% 1438.7 0.12% 29.2 29.2 -0.04% 29.2 -0.03%
23 1437.2 1435.9 0.09% 1435.9 0.09% 27.9 27.9 0.00% 27.9 0.00%
24 1962.3 1922.5 2.03% 1924.9 1.91% 34.8 34.7 0.47% 34.6 0.49%
25 14268.6 5707.5 60.00% 6230.9 56.33% 174 82.7 52.46% 94.0 45.95%
26 3082.0 2860.2 7.20% 2872.2 6.81% 40.6 39.4 3.08% 39.4 2.96%
27 1440.6 1438.9 0.12% 1439.0 0.12% 29.5 29.5 0.05% 29.5 0.06%
28 2245.3 2182.9 2.78% 2185.8 2.65% 36.2 36.1 0.29% 36.1 0.33%
29 2433.0 2344.5 3.64% 2347.8 3.50% 37.6 37.0 1.41% 37.1 1.27%
30 2239.0 2175.2 2.85% 2178.0 2.72% 36.4 36.1 0.76% 36.2 0.66%
31 2380.8 2302.9 3.27% 2308.4 3.04% 38.6 38.7 -0.08% 38.7 -0.12%
Total 99296.8 77047.8 22.4% 78371.2 21.1% 1460.9 1212.7 17.0% 1235.0 15.5%
24
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479455 
the remaining 10 days, the cost reduction is no more than 0.25%. For the entire month, total cost
minimization and profit maximization policies reduce the total cost of charging electric vehicles by
22.4% and 21.1%, respectively.
The CO2 emissions reductions are generally correlated with the cost reductions, but there are
two caveats. First, the emissions reduction percentages are typically lower than the cost reduc-
tion percentages because the public and private utility firm’s objectives do not include emissions.
There are five days for which the total cost minimization and profit maximization policies increase
emissions slightly (less than 0.12%). Second, the emissions reduction percentages can exceed the
cost reduction percentages (notably on August 10th and 12th), primarily because of the increased
use of natural gas-fired generators with low emissions. In aggregate, the two policies reduce the
monthly CO2 emissions of electric vehicle charging by 17% and 15.5%, respectively.
These results have important practical implications: First, to achieve most of the benefits, the
incentives for customers to delay electric vehicle charging need to be used only during the peak
days. In fact, a public or a private utility firm, by employing smart charging in only 4 peak days
(August 10th, 11th, 12th, 25th) can reduce the charging cost by 20.5% or 19.3%, respectively,
and the emissions can be reduced by 16.2% or 14.7%, respectively. In other words, approximately
92 to 95% of the cost and emissions reductions are achieved on those 4 peak days, highlighting
the importance of managing electric vehicle charging on peak days. Second, although the profit
maximization policy of a private utility firm distorts the electric vehicle charging schedules that
would otherwise minimize the overall cost, the distortion appears to be small. Therefore, regulators
should encourage both private and public utility firms to operate smart charging stations.
We now examine how the cost and emissions reductions reported in Table 2 are achieved by
scheduling the charging of 2,500 electric vehicles. Figure 5 uses the same color-coding scheme as
Figure 4 to identify different levels of delay-sensitivity. The brightness of the colors differentiate
arrival times, with lighter (darker) colors for customers arriving earlier (later) in the day. Each
color represents 100 customers as before. In Figure 5, we consider the total cost minimization
policy of a public utility firm.
Figure 5 (a) shows the charging schedules for the first 1,000 customers arriving when the elec-
tricity demand from other sources is rapidly increasing. The charging schedule is close to ASAP
policy, because delaying charging for these customers will only incur higher cost, but a slight de-
lay is planned for the least delay-sensitive customers in the second group. Such a delay smooths
the total demand from 1:00 to 2:00 p.m., which is reflected in Figure 5 (b). Load smoothing is
particularly important when the marginal cost rapidly increases near the peak hours.
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Figure 5: (Color online) Electric vehicle charging schedule on a typical peak day (August 25, 2016)
under total cost minimization policy of a public utility firm
(a) First two arriving customer groups (b) Scheduling customer group 3
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(c) Scheduling customer group 4 (d) Scheduling customer group 5
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Figure 5 (b) reveals an important feature of the optimal schedule. The least delay-sensitive
customers in group 3 (indicated in bright red) start charging as soon as they arrive at 1:00 p.m.
The charging pauses at 2:30 p.m., resumes at 7:00 p.m., and finishes shortly after 8:30 p.m. This
4.5-hour delay allows the public utility firm to schedule the next two groups of customers.
In Figure 5 (c), the least delay sensitive customers in group 4 have their vehicles charged from
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7:30 p.m. to shortly after 10:30 p.m. In addition, customers who are more sensitive to delays
also have to experience some delays. All these delays greatly help reduce and flatten the total
demand during the peak hours, leading to reduced charging cost and emissions. Observe that the
schedule actually completes charging for group 4 customers with θ(i), i = 2, . . . , 5 earlier than the
aforementioned group 3 customers who finish charging at 8:30 p.m.
Figure 5 (d) shows that the delayed demand during the peak hours is shifted to evening. From
7:00 to 8:30 p.m., some vehicles from groups 3, 4, and 5 are charged at the same time. Group 5
customers all experience some delays.
For brevity, we omit the illustration for the optimal charging schedule under a private utility
firm’s profit maximization policy, which is similar to the schedule under the public utility firm’s
total cost minimization policy, illustrated in Figure 5. Both policies’ cost breakdowns and the
incentive-compatible prices are shown in Table 3.
The profit maximization policy results in a lower inconvenience cost than the total cost mini-
mization policy, charging customers higher prices (3.6% higher on average), yielding a revenue that
is also 3.6% or $802.5 higher. The charging cost is 9.2% or $523.4 higher. Therefore, the private
utility firm achieves a profit that is $279.1 or 1.7% higher than the public utility firm. However,
Table 3: Electric vehicle charging on a typical peak day (August 25, 2016)
As soon as
possible
(ASAP)
Total cost
minimization
(TCM)
Profit
maximization
(PM)
Inconvenience cost ($) 0 1420.5 1010.1
Charging cost ($) 14268.6 5707.5 6230.9
Charging cost ($ per kWh) 0.285 0.114 0.125
Total cost ($) 14268.6 7128.0 7241.0
Prices ($) [ p
(i)
t ] [ 10 ]

10 9.98 7.96 3.25 7.72
10 10 10 4.73 8.06
10 10 10 8.06 8.62
10 10 10 9.20 9.25
10 10 10 9.66 9.53


10 9.98 7.96 5.53 8.26
10 10 9.98 7.05 8.62
10 10 10 8.88 9.18
10 10 10 9.52 9.51
10 10 10 9.88 9.70

Total payment ($) 25000 22600.4 23402.9
Profit (= payment − charging cost) 10731.4 16892.9 17172.0
Total information rent ($) 0 979.1 586.9
CO2 emissions (kilograms per kWh
of EV charging)
3.48 1.65 1.88
Total CO2 emissions from charging
(metric tons)
174.0 82.7 94.0
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the CO2 emissions increase from 82.7 to 94.0 metric tons, which is a 13.7% increase. This emissions
difference may be concerning, but the emissions differences are generally small for most of the days
(see Table 2). For the entire August, the total CO2 emissions under the private utility firm is 1.8%
higher than that under a public utility firm. Both firms reduce emissions substantially compared
to the current practice of ASAP policy.
8. Conclusion
Electric vehicles will transform urban mobility in smart cities, which requires innovative business
models for charging stations. We propose smart charging of electric vehicles—delaying charging
until electricity generation cost is lower during a day—as an alternative to the current practice of
completing charging as soon as possible. By considering the cost minimization and profit maxi-
mization objectives of public and private utility firms, respectively, we characterize pricing schemes
that motivate customers to allow smart charging.
Our results have significant managerial and policy implications. We devise the juice-filing policy
which can be easily implemented to determine the smart charging schedule of electric vehicles.
Through a comprehensive analysis of the largest electricity market in the U.S., we demonstrate that
compared to the current practice, smart charging leads to approximately 20% and 15% cost and
emissions savings, respectively. Moreover, most of these savings can be achieved by implementing
smart charging only a few peak-demand days in a month, highlighting its practical relevance. From
a policy perspective, our results show that allowing either public or private utility firms to own and
operate charging stations can lead to significant cost and emissions savings.
Finally, in this paper, we assume that charging stations have ample parking spots. If spots
are limited, the benefits of smart charging would be less pronounced, but the fundamental tradeoff
between the charging cost and the inconvenience cost that we focused on remains valid.
References
Aks¸in, Z., B. Ata, S. Emadi, C.-L. Su 2013. Structural estimation of callers’ delay sensitivity in call centers.
Management Sci. 59(12) 2727–2746.
Al-Gwaiz, M., X. Chao, O. Wu 2016. Understanding how generation flexibility and renewable energy affect
power market competition. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 19(1) 114–131.
Ata, B., S. Duran, O. I˙slegen 2018. An analysis of time-based pricing in electricity supply chains. Working
paper. University of Chicago.
Avci, B., K. Girotra, S. Netessine 2014. Electric vehicles with a battery switching station: Adoption and
28
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479455 
environmental impact. Management Sci. 61(4) 772–794.
Baker, T., S. Aibino, E. Belsito, G. Aubert, A. Sahoo 2019. Electric vehicles are a multibillion-dollar opportu-
nity for utilities. Boston Consulting Group. Last accessed September 12, 2019, https://www.bcg.com/
publications/2019/electric-vehicles-multibillion-dollar-opportunity-utilities.aspx.
Bertsekas, D. P. 2007. Dynamic programming and optimal control. Vol. 1. Athena scientific Belmont, MA.
Blink 2019. EV charging fees. Last accessed March 7, 2019, https://perma.cc/R93D-A265.
Cawley, J., N. Kennard 2018. A guide to utility ratemaking. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. Last ac-
cessed August 4, 2019, http://www.puc.pa.gov/General/publications_reports/pdf/Ratemaking_
Guide2018.pdf.
Chocteau, V., D. Drake, P. Kleindorfer, R. Orsato, A. Roset 2011. Collaborative innovation for sustainable
fleet operations: The electric vehicle adoption decision. Working paper. University of Colorado.
DOE 2015. United States electricity industry primer. Department of Energy (DOE). Last accessed September
4, 2019, https://perma.cc/5EKA-XT4Y.
EIA 2007. Electric power industry overview 2007. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Last accessed
September 11, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/archive/primer.
EIA 2017. Annual energy outlook. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Last accessed August 12, 2019,
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo17/tables_ref.php.
EPA 2019. Emissions & generation resource integrated database. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA). Last accessed August 4, 2019, https://www.epa.gov/energy/
emissions-generation-resource-integrated-database-egrid.
Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
Hasija, S., Z.-J. Shen, C.-P. Teo 2019. Smart city operations: Modelling challenges and opportunities.
Manufacturing Service Oper. Management Forthcoming.
He, L., G. Ma, W. Qi, X. Wang 2019. Charging electric vehicle sharing fleet. Manufacturing Service Oper.
Management Forthcoming.
He, L., H.-Y. Mak, Y. Rong, Z.-J. Shen 2017. Service region design for urban electric vehicle sharing systems.
Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 19(2) 309–327.
Hu, S., G. Souza, M. Ferguson, W. Wang 2015. Capacity investment in renewable energy technology with
supply intermittency: Data granularity matters!. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 17(4) 480–
494.
Kapuscinski, R., O. Wu, S. Suresh 2019. Operations and investment of energy storage in a tree network.
Working paper. University of Indiana.
Ko¨k, G., K. Shang, S¸. Yu¨cel 2018. Impact of electricity pricing policies on renewable energy investments and
29
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479455 
carbon emissions. Management Sci. 64(1) 131–148.
Ko¨k, G., K. Shang, S¸. Yu¨cel 2019. Investments in renewable and conventional energy: The role of operational
flexibility. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management Forthcoming.
Lazar, J. 2016. Electricity regulation in the U.S.: A guide. Regulatory Assistance Project. Last accessed
September 11, 2019, https://perma.cc/9U7Q-LZPN.
Lim, M., H.-Y. Mak, Y. Rong 2015. Toward mass adoption of electric vehicles: Impact of the range and
resale anxieties. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 17(1) 101–119.
Mak, H.-Y. 2018. Enabling smarter cities with operations management. Working paper. University of Oxford.
Mak, H.-Y., Y. Rong, Z.-J. Shen 2013. Infrastructure planning for electric vehicles with battery swapping.
Management Sci. 59(7) 1557–1575.
McKinsey & Company 2018. Charging ahead: Electric-vehicle infrastructure demand. Last accessed March
7, 2019, https://perma.cc/9P7A-SP8Q.
NERC 2019. Generating availability data system. North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).
Last accessed August 11, 2019, https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/gads/Pages/Reports.aspx.
Osuna, E. 1985. The psychological cost of waiting. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 29(1) 82–105.
PJM 2018. PJM annual report. PJM Interconnect. Last accessed August 4, 2019, https://perma.cc/
X3R9-R73R.
Qi, W., L. Li, S. Liu, Z.-J. Shen 2018. Shared mobility for last-mile delivery: Design, operational prescrip-
tions, and environmental impact. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 20(4) 737–751.
Qi, W., Z.-J. Shen 2019. A smart-city scope of operations management. Production Oper. Management
28(2) 393–406.
SCE 2014. Plug-in electric vehicle workplace charging pilot. Southern California Edison (SCE). Last accessed
March 6, 2019, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442453598.
SEPA 2017. Utilities and electric vehicles: The case for managed charging. Smart Electric Power Alliance
(SEPA). Last accessed March 15, 2019, https://sepapower.org/resource/ev-managed-charging.
SEPA 2019. Preparing for an electric vehicle future: How utilities can succeed. Smart Electric Power Alliance
(SEPA). Last accessed October 16, 2019, https://perma.cc/Q2F9-YLZH.
Sha, M., W. Qi, S. Li 2019. When shared autonomous electric vehicles meet microgrids: Citywide energy-
mobility orchestration. Working paper. Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Sunar, N., J. Birge 2019. Strategic commitment to a production schedule with uncertain supply and demand:
Renewable energy in day-ahead electricity markets. Management Sci. 65(2) 714–734.
The Washington Post 2015. Electric cars and the coal that runs them. Last accessed September 4, 2019,
30
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479455 
https://perma.cc/9XHH-89V4.
Utility Dive 2019. State of the electric utility 2019 survey report. Last accessed August 26, 2019, https:
//resources.industrydive.com/State-of-the-Electric-Utility-2019-Survey-Report.
World Economic Forum 2018. Electric vehicles for smarter cities: The future of energy and mobility. Last
accessed March 5, 2019, https://perma.cc/7LFP-SAAW.
Wu, O., D. Wang, Z. Qin 2012. Seasonal energy storage operations with limited flexibility: The price-adjusted
rolling intrinsic policy. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 14(3) 455–471.
Wu, O., R. Kapuscinski 2013. Curtailing intermittent generation in electrical systems. Manufacturing Service
Oper. Management 15(4) 578–595.
Zhang, Y., M. Lu, S. Shen 2019. On the values of vehicle-to-grid electricity selling in electric vehicle sharing.
Manufacturing Service Oper. Management Forthcoming.
Zhou, Y., A. Scheller-Wolf, N. Secomandi, S. Smith 2016. Electricity trading and negative prices: Storage
vs. disposal. Management Sci. 62(3) 880–898.
Zhou, Y., A. Scheller-Wolf, N. Secomandi, S. Smith 2019. Managing wind-based electricity generation in the
presence of storage and transmission capacity. Production Oper. Management 28(4) 970–989.
31
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479455 
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The utility firm’s second-stage problem (6)-(10) can be expressed in the
standard form (Bertsekas 2007, Section 7.1) as
min
{an(t), n=1,...,N}
h
(
x1(τ1), . . . , xN (τN )
)
+
∫ T
0
c˜
(
N∑
n=1
an(t) + d(t)
)
dt−
∫ T
0
c˜(d(t))dt (A.1)
s.t.
dxn(t)
dt
= an(t) ∀n = 1, . . . , N, (A.2)
0 ≤ an(t) ≤ a ∀n = 1, . . . , N, (A.3)
where xn(t) =
∫ t
0 an(s) ds is the state variable representing the level of electricity charged by time t
to electric vehicle n, an(t) is the control variable, and
h
(
x1(τ1), . . . , xN (τN )
)
=
0 if xn(τn) = 1 ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N},∞ otherwise, (A.4)
represents terminal conditions. Also, in (A.1), we substitute the cost function of (6) as c(q(t)|d(t)) =
c˜(q(t) + d(t))− c˜(d(t)), where q(t) =
N∑
n=1
an(t). Given that the term
∫ T
0 c˜(d(t))dt is constant in the
control variable an(t)’s, we omit it from the optimization below. A unique feature of this problem
is that the terminal condition imposed on xn(t) through h(x1(τ1), · · · , xN (τN )) applies at different
times τn. Accordingly, the number of control variables decreases over time.
We first show that the control policy found through the juice-filling policy is an optimal solution
to the problem (A.1)-(A.3) for the special case with one electric vehicle (i.e., when N = 1) using
Pontryagin’s minimum principle (Bertsekas 2007, Section 7.3). The Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation is given as
H(x, a, p) = c˜(a+ d) + pa, (A.5)
where the adjoint equation p(t) (not to be confused with charging prices p(i)’s) is given by
dp(t)
dt
= −∂H (x
∗(t), a∗(t), p(t))
∂x
= 0, (A.6)
where a∗(t) is the optimal control trajectory and x∗(t) is the corresponding state trajectory. This
implies that p(t) is a constant for t ∈ [0, T ], i.e., p(t) = p for some p. We next minimize the HJB,
subject to the terminal condition:
min
0≤a≤a
{H(x, a, p) = c˜(a+ d) + pa} (A.7)
s.t.
∫ T
0
a(t)dt = 1. (A.8)
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Because c˜(·) is a convex function, H(x, a, p) is also convex in a and the first-order condition is
given as dH(x,a,p)da = c˜
′
(a+ d) + p = 0, where c˜
′
(·) is the derivative of the cost function. Taking the
constraint that 0 ≤ a(t) ≤ a into account, the optimal action is to set a∗(t) = min ((z − d(t))+ , a),
where c˜
′
(z) = −p. Note that z is constant because p is a constant. To find the value of z, we
substitute a∗(t) in the terminal condition (A.8) so that z is implicitly given by∫ T
0
min
(
(z − d(t))+ , a) dt = 1. (A.9)
This control policy is the same as the one found by the juice-filling policy for the special case with
one electric vehicle (i.e., when N = 1), where z is given in Step 2 and L(t) = d(t). Therefore, the
juice-filling policy finds an optimal solution to the problem (A.1)-(A.3).
We next prove that the juice-filling policy is optimal for N > 1. We index electric vehicles
with n such that τN ≤ · · · ≤ τ1. Let a∗n(t) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} be an optimal solution to the
charging problem (A.1)-(A.3). Using the juice-filling policy, we construct another solution aˆn(t) for
n ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that this solution is also optimal. We next describe the construction of this
solution in the interval t ∈ [0, τN ], where τN is the earliest completion time. In essence, we find the
charging policy aˆn(t) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} for N vehicles with simultaneous arrival (i.e., t = 0) and
completion times (i.e., t = τN ) such that each vehicle is charged by time τN to the same level as
that under the optimal policy, i.e., xˆn(τN ) = x
∗
n(τN ) =
∫ τN
0 a
∗
n(t)dt for n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, we
show that this charging policy achieves the same cost as the optimal policy.
The charging policy aˆn(t) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} in the interval t ∈ [0, τN ] can be constructed by
applying the juice-filling policy with two modifications: Let T = τN and in Step 2, find zn such that∫ τN
0 min
{
(zn − L(t))+ , a
}
dt = x∗n(τN ). Note that, these modifications do not affect the vehicle
n = N because x∗N (τN ) = 1. That is, the charging schedule of vehicle N , i.e., aˆN (t), is still found
through the juice-filling policy.
We next verify that the resulting charging cost under the modified policy is the same as that
under the juice-filling policy for charging one electric vehicle. Specifically, consider the juice-filling
policy for one vehicle (which was shown to be optimal using Pontryagin’s minimum principle) such
that the vehicle’s completion time is τN , its maximum charging speed is aN , and the vehicle needs
to be charged with
N∑
n=1
x∗n(τN ) units of energy. Following similar steps as above, we can show that
there exists z such that ∫ τN
0
min
(
(z − d(t))+ , aN) dt = N∑
n=1
x∗n(τN ). (A.10)
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that z above is the same as zN of the modified policy
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such that the two policies have the same cost. Given the optimality of the juice-filling policy for
one vehicle, charging policy aˆn(t) for n ∈ {1, . . . , I} is an optimal policy for t ∈ [0, τN ] . That is,∫ τN
0 c˜
(∑N
n=1 aˆn(t) + d(t)
)
dt =
∫ τN
0 c˜
(∑N
n=1 a
∗
n(t) + d(t)
)
dt.
Notice that in constructing aˆN (t) for t ∈ [0, τN ], we have used the juice-filling policy, where∫ τN
0 min
{
(zN − d(t))+ , a
}
dt = 1 so that aˆN (t) = min
{
(zN − d(t))+ , a
}
for t ∈ [0, τN ]. We then
update L(t) with L(t) + aˆN (t), proceed to the time interval t ∈ [0, τN−1], where τN−1 is the
completion time of vehicle N − 1. By the same arguments as above, we can construct aˆn(t) for all
n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} in t ∈ [0, τN−1] and show that it achieves the same cost as the optimal policy.
This procedure can be repeated for all vehicles and time intervals. Therefore, the control policy
aˆn(t) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N} found through the juice-filling policy identifies an optimal solution to the
charging problem (A.1)-(A.3).
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) For given (τ1, . . . , τN ), let the optimal control be {a∗1(t), . . . , a∗N (t)}.
Because {b1, . . . , bN} is a permutation of {1, . . . , N}, the control {a∗b1(t), . . . , a∗bN (t)} must be fea-
sible under completion time (τb1 , . . . , τbN ) because
∫ τbn
0
abn(t) dt = 1, ∀n = 1, . . . , N . Further-
more, this feasible control yields the same objective value in (6) because q(t) =
N∑
n=1
abn(t) =
N∑
n=1
an(t). If, however, there exists another control {a˜∗b1(t), . . . , a˜∗bN (t)} that is strictly better than
{a∗b1(t), . . . , a∗bN (t)} , then {a˜1(t)∗, . . . , a˜∗N (t)} must be feasible under (τ1, . . . , τN ) and strictly better
than {a∗1(t), . . . , a∗N (t)}, leading to a contradiction. Hence, we have C(τb1 , . . . , τbN ) = C(τ1, . . . , τN ).
(ii) The optimal control for (6)-(10) under any given (τ1, . . . , τN ) remains a feasible control
under (τˆ1, . . . , τˆN ) ≥ (τ1, . . . , τN ). It follows that C(τ1, . . . , τN ) decreases in τn for any n.
Proof of Lemma 2: The public utility firm’s objective function is given as
E{θn, n=1,...,N}
[
N∑
n=1
θnδ(τn) + C(τ1, . . . , τN )
]
=
I∑
i1=1
I∑
i2=1
· · ·
I∑
iN=1
{
N∏
n=1
β(in)
[
N∑
n=1
(
θ(in)δ(τ (in))
)
+ C(τ (i1), τ (i2), · · · , τ (iN ))
]}
. (A.11)
For given β(in)’s, any solution with τ (n) < τ (m) for n < m, we can (weakly) reduce the objective
value by swapping τ (n) and τ (m). This swap does not affect the charging cost C(τ (i1), τ (i2), · · · , τ (iN ))
due to Lemma 1 (i), but it (weakly) reduces the inconvenience cost
N∑
n=1
(
θ(in)δ(τ (in))
)
because
θ(n)δ(τ (m)) + θ(m)δ(τ (n)) ≤ θ(n)δ(τ (n)) + θ(m)δ(τ (m)) (A.12)
or equivalently, θ(n)
(
δ(τ (m))− δ(τ (n))) ≤ θ(m) (δ(τ (m))− δ(τ (n))). This inequality follows from
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θ(m) > θ(n) and δ(τ) increases in τ . Because swapping τ (n) and τ (m) does not increase the objective
value, there exists an optimal solution satisfying τ (1)∗ ≥ τ (2)∗ ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I)∗.
Proof of Proposition 2: We first show the existence of a set of prices {p(1), . . . , p(I)} which
satisfies individual rationality constraints (12) and incentive-compatibility constraints
θ(i)δ(τ (i)) + p(i) ≤ θ(i)δ(τ (j)) + p(j), ∀i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , I, (A.13)
which are equivalent to the definition given in (2)-(3) such that a customer with class θ(i) finds
it optimal to choose the pair (p(i), τ (i)). Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 7.3), a
necessary and sufficient condition for an incentive-compatible pricing scheme to exist is that τ (i) is
decreasing in θ(i). This condition holds because τ (1) ≥ τ (2) ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I), where θ(1) < θ(2) < · · · <
θ(I) by definition. Therefore, an incentive-compatible pricing scheme exists and this set of prices
can be adjusted with a constant to ensure that the individual rationality constraints are also met.
We next construct this incentive-compatible and individually rational pricing scheme. For
simplicity, let δ(i)
.
= δ(τ (i)) for i = 1, . . . , I. Because the disutility δ(τ) increases in τ and τ (1) ≥
τ (2) ≥ · · · ≥ τ (I), we have δ(1) ≥ δ(2) ≥ · · · ≥ δ(I).
First, we set p(I) ≤ u0−θ(I)δ(I)−u, so that a customer with θ(I) receives at least the reservation
utility if the customer chooses completion time τ (I). Then, for i = I−1, I−2, . . . , 1, we sequentially
set p(i), such that the following 2(I − i) incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied:
θ(j)δ(j) + p(j) ≤ θ(j)δ(i) + p(i), θ(i)δ(i) + p(i) ≤ θ(i)δ(j) + p(j), ∀j = i+ 1, . . . , I. (A.14)
At the end of the above procedure, all of 2 + 4 + · · ·+ 2(I − 1) = I(I − 1) incentive compatibility
constraints for all I customer classes are satisfied.
The constraints in (A.14) can be equivalently written as
p(i) ∈ [max
j>i
{p(j) − θ(j)(δ(i) − δ(j))}, min
j>i
{p(j) − θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(j))}]. (A.15)
The lower (upper) bound ensures that no customer strictly prefers to choose a lower (higher) class
than his/her true class.
We next simplify the bounds for p(i) in (A.15) to obtain the bounds given in Proposition 2. The
incentive compatibility for any two θ(j) and θ(k) customers requires θ(k)δ(k) + p(k) ≤ θ(k)δ(j) + p(j)
and θ(j)δ(j) + p(j) ≤ θ(j)δ(k) + p(k), which are equivalent to
θ(k)(δ(k) − δ(j)) ≤ p(j) − p(k) ≤ θ(j)(δ(k) − δ(j)). (A.16)
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Consider the ordering of the terms, {p(j)−θ(j)(δ(i)−δ(j)), j = i+1, . . . , I}. Let i < j < k. Then,
p(j) − p(k) − θ(j)(δ(i) − δ(j)) + θ(k)(δ(i) − δ(k)) ≥ θ(k)(δ(k) − δ(j))− θ(j)(δ(i) − δ(j)) + θ(k)(δ(i) − δ(k))
= (θ(k) − θ(j))(δ(i) − δ(j)) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is due to the first inequality in (A.16), and the last inequality is due
to θ(j) ≤ θ(k) and δ(i) ≥ δ(j). Therefore, j = i + 1 maximizes the lower bound in (A.15), i.e.,
max
j>i
{p(j) − θ(j)(δ(i) − δ(j))} = p(i+1) − θ(i+1)(δ(i) − δ(i+1)).
Consider the ordering of the terms {p(j)−θ(i)(δ(i)−δ(j)), j = i+1, . . . , I}. Let i < j < k. Then,
p(j) − p(k) − θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(j)) + θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(k)) ≤ θ(j)(δ(k) − δ(j))− θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(j)) + θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(k))
= (θ(j) − θ(i))(δ(k) − δ(j)) ≤ 0,
where the first inequality is due to the second inequality in (A.16), and the last inequality follows
from θ(i) ≤ θ(j) and δ(j) ≥ δ(k). Therefore, j = i + 1 minimizes the upper bound in (A.15), i.e.,
min
j>i
{p(j) − θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(j))} = p(i+1) − θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(i+1)).
Therefore, the feasible interval for pi in (A.15) becomes:
p(i) ∈ [p(i+1) − θ(i+1)(δ(i) − δ(i+1)), p(i+1) − θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(i+1))], (A.17)
which is clearly nonempty, because δ(i) ≥ δ(i+1) and θ(i) ≤ θ(i+1).
To see that the pricing scheme is individually rational (i.e., reservation utility is met), note that
(u0 − θ(i)δ(i) − p(i) − u)− (u0 − θ(i+1)δ(i+1) − p(i+1) − u) ≥ θ(i)(δ(i+1) − δ(i))− p(i) + p(i+1) ≥ 0,
where the first inequality is due to θ(i+1) > θ(i) and the second inequality follows from (A.17). That
is, the utility of a customer in class i is higher than that of a customer in class i + 1. Given that
the pricing scheme is individually rational for a customer in class I by construction, then it is also
individually rational for all classes.
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that the given prices in the proposition correspond to the upper
bounds of the prices in Proposition 2. Therefore, these prices continue to satisfy individual ratio-
nality constraints (12) and incentive compatibility constraints (A.13). Moreover, given that they
are the upper bounds, they maximize the utility firm’s profit.
Proof of Proposition 4: The private utility firm’s objective function in (13) is given as
E{θn, n=1,...,N}
[
N∑
n=1
pn − C(τ1, . . . , τN )
]
= NE [pn]− E [C(τ1, . . . , τN )] . (A.18)
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Consider the expected revenue NE [pn]. Based on the iterative procedure given in (17) and letting
δ(i)
.
= δ(τ (i)) for i = 1, . . . , I we can write
p(i) = u0 − θ(I)δ(I) − θ(I−1)(δ(I−1) − δ(I))− · · · − θ(i)(δ(i) − δ(i+1))− u
= u0 − (θ(I) − θ(I−1))δ(I) − · · · − (θ(i+1) − θ(i))δ(i+1) − θ(i)δ(i) − u
= u0 − θ(i)δ(i) − u−
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(j+1).
Therefore, the expected revenue is
NE [pn] = N
I∑
i=1
β(i)p(i) = N
I∑
i=1
β(i)
u0 − θ(i)δ(i) − u− I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(j+1)

= N(u0 − u)−N
I∑
i=1
β(i)θ(i)δ(i) −N
I∑
i=1
β(i)
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(j+1)
= N(u0 − u)− E
[
N∑
n=1
θnδn
]
−N
I∑
i=1
β(i)
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(j+1)
By substituting the above expected revenue in (A.18), the private utility firm’s objective in (13)
can be rewritten as
max
{τ (i)∈[w,T ], i=1,...,I}
N(u0 − u)− E
[
N∑
n=1
θnδn
]
− E [C(τ1, . . . , τI)]−N
I∑
i=1
β(i)
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(j+1),
This is equivalent to the private utility firm’s objective in Proposition 4 becauseN(u0−u) is constant
in τ (i)’s. Finally, note that for β(i) = 1I , the information rent termN
I∑
i=1
β(i)
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1)−θ(j))δ(j+1) =
N
I
I∑
i=1
I−1∑
j=i
(θ(j+1) − θ(j))δ(j+1) =
I∑
i=2
(i− 1) (θ(i) − θ(i−1)) δ(i).
Proof of Proposition 5: Threshold zn,j ’s can be computed via the following problem:
min
{zn,j , n=1,...,N, j=1,...,2N}
∫ T
0
c
(
q(t)|d(t))dt (A.19)
s.t. (20), (21), (23), zn,j = 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , 2N, ∀n 6∈ I(tj) and (A.20)
an(t) = min
{(
zn,j − d(t)−
∑
k<n
ak(t)
)+
, a
}
∀t ∈ [tj , tj + 1], ∀j = 1, . . . , 2N, ∀n ∈ I(tj), (A.21)
where the decision variables of the original objective function (19), i.e., {an(t), n = 1, . . . , N}, are
replaced with the threshold zn,j ’s in (A.19). Given that an(t)’s are functions but zn,j ’s are scalars,
solving the above problem is simpler than solving the original problem. In this formulation, (A.21)
implicitly define the charging schedule as a function of the thresholds.
Similar to the simultaneous arrivals case, the charging problem (19)-(23) can be expressed in
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the standard form (A.1)-(A.3), with the additional constraint that vehicle n cannot be charged if
it is not at the station at time t, i.e., an(t) = 0, ∀t 6∈ [sn, τn].
We prove the optimality of the charging policy for non-simultaneous arrivals (given zn,j ’s) by
induction. First consider the time interval [t2N−1, t2N ] in which there is only one electric vehicle
at the station. Let its index be k. Consistent with the standard form (A.1)-(A.3), denote the
level of electricity charged by time t2N−1 to vehicle k by xk(t2N−1). Given that vehicle k is the
only vehicle in the station in this time interval, we can use Pontryagin’s minimum principle to
identify the optimal charging schedule as in the proof of Proposition 1: There exists a threshold
zk,2N−1, where
∫ t2N
t2N−1 min
{
(zk,2N−1 − d(t))+ , a
}
dt = 1 − xk(t2N−1) such that it is optimal to
set a∗k(t) = min
{(
zk,2N−1 − d(t)
)+
, a
}
for t ∈ [t2N−1, t2N ]. It is straightforward to verify that
the charging policy for non-simultaneous arrivals essentially leads to the same charging decision.
Therefore, the policy is optimal for t ∈ [t2N−1, t2N ].
Suppose the policy is optimal for intervals [tj+1, tj+2], . . . , [t2N−2, t2N−1] for some j ∈ {1, . . . , 2N−
1}. We next prove the policy is also optimal in [tj , tj+1]. For this time interval, let a∗n(t) be an
optimal solution for n ∈ I(tj). The charging policy for non-simultaneous arrivals (given zn,j ’s) pro-
duces a charging schedule for vehicles k ∈ I(tj) such that each vehicle is charged
∫ tj+1
tj
a∗k(t)dt units
of electricity by time tj+1. As discussed in the proof of Propositon 1, this schedule is also optimal
for t ∈ [tj , tj+1] because it is equivalent to charging one electric vehicle with
∑
k∈I(t)
∫ tj+1
tj
a∗k(t)dt
units of electricity by time tj+1. Given that the policy for non-simultaneous arrivals is also optimal
for [tj , tj+1], by induction, it is optimal for all intervals.
Finally, in the above analysis, without loss of generality, we assume that when customer n
arrives at the charging station there is at least one other customer whose vehicle is being charged.
Otherwise, the utility firm’s problem can be decoupled into multiple problems, which can be solved
separately.
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